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Abstract This study of real estate investment trusts (REITs) analyzes three
possible explanations for the stock price reaction to a repurchase
announcement and the subsequent repurchase behavior of
managers under each hypothesis. Two of the hypotheses, the
signaling hypothesis and the exchange option hypothesis, are
established in the existing literature; the third hypothesis is a
modiﬁcation of the exchange option hypothesis. The exchange
option hypothesis is extended to allow for additional ﬂexibility
in management decisions. This extended exchange option
hypothesis is termed the ‘‘straddle’’ hypothesis because it
provides management with both a call and put option. The
empirical analyses show the straddle hypothesis is a more robust
explanation of changes in shares outstanding in the post-
announcement period than the alternative explanations.
A key element of corporate real estate and corporate ﬁnance theory is the return
of operating proﬁts to stockholders. As such, stock repurchases have been studied
extensively. Masulis (1980), Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981, 1984), Lakonishok
and Vermaelen (1990), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and
Vermaelen (1995, 2000), and Brau and Holmes (2006) all document positive
abnormal stock price performance around the announcement of stock repurchases.
The existing literature posits several plausible hypotheses to explain these
abnormal returns. The most frequently referenced and studied among these
‘‘traditional’’ hypotheses are: (1) signaling (or information content) effects
associated with ﬁrm undervaluation; (2) agency cost (or free cash ﬂow) effects
associated with the disgorgement of cash to shareholders; and (3) personal tax
effects associated with differential taxation of dividends and capital gains. Given
that these theories all predict the same stock price reaction to repurchase
announcements, disentangling the impact of the competing hypotheses has proven
elusive (e.g., see Nohel and Tarhan, 1998).
In addition to the traditional hypotheses, Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) suggest
that the abnormal performance of announcing ﬁrms is due to the value of the116  Adams, Brau, and Holmes
exchange option created by the repurchase announcement (see Margrabe, 1978)
for a discussion of exchange option valuation. An exchange option created by a
repurchase announcement allows management to exploit deviations in the
information sets possessed by ﬁrm insiders (i.e., management) and outside
investors (i.e., other market participants). The exchange option hypothesis
contends that the repurchase announcement expands the ﬁrm’s investment
opportunity set by authorizing management to repurchase shares in the future if
their ‘‘inside’’ information indicates that the buyback will beneﬁt long-term
shareholders.1 Hence, even if the ﬁrm is fairly valued at the time of the
announcement, the value of the ﬁrm will increase concomitantly with the value
of the option created by the repurchase announcement.
If a repurchase announcement serves to create an exchange option, one would
predict that many of the repurchase options would not be ‘‘exercised.’’ In fact,
most repurchase programs are never completed. Wiggins (1994), Usem, Shulman,
and Brown (1995) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) all report that only a
fraction of announced repurchase programs are completed.2 Hence, the exchange
option hypothesis offers a potential explanation for both the positive stock price
reaction to the repurchase announcement and the low frequency with which the
programs are completed.
Brau and Holmes (2006) study the traditional hypotheses (i.e., signaling, agency
cost, and tax effect) using a real estate investment trust (REIT) sample, but do
not consider the exchange option hypothesis. REITs offer a unique laboratory for
the study of repurchase announcements.3 Brau and Holmes argue that as an asset
class, REITs possess several unique institutional attributes that render irrelevant
the economic intuition sustaining agency cost and personal tax effect theories’
explanations for the positive stock price reaction to repurchase announcements.
In particular, since REITs are required to distribute 95% of income to shareholders
in the form of dividends and are exempted from Federal income taxation, possible
agency cost and personal tax effect impacts are mitigated. The 95% distribution
rule diminishes managers’ ability to accumulate and misuse large cash reserves,
reducing the agency costs associated with REIT ownership and thus making the
agency cost hypothesis untenable. Similarly, the 95% rule requires large dividend
payments (95% of income), which implies that REIT investors are insensitive to
the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains,4 thus making the personal
tax effects hypothesis untenable. In an empirical analysis of announcement-period
data for a REIT sample, Brau and Holmes show that among traditional hypotheses,
only the signaling hypothesis has economic merit in explaining the positive stock
price reaction associated with REIT repurchase announcements.5
However, announcement period analysis cannot be used to differentiate between
a signaling effect and an exchange option effect. Hence, in contrast to Brau and
Holmes (2006), this research examines returns subsequent to the repurchase
announcement (similar to data used by Giambona, Giaccotto, and Sirmans, 2005),
as well as repurchase completion rates. The examination of the long-run
implementation of the repurchase announcement allows separation of theREIT Stock Repurchases  117
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valuation-type motivations from option-type motivations and analysis of the
efﬁcacy of these competing hypotheses. Furthermore, the exchange option
hypothesis is extended to include both a bull (long call) and a bear (long put)
option. The extended exchange option hypothesis is referred to here as the
‘‘straddle’’ hypothesis.
The exchange option hypothesis assumes that the repurchase announcement
provides management with a long call option on the ﬁrm’s stock. As a means of
explaining management behavior, the straddle hypothesis combines the long call
option created by the repurchase announcement with the existing long put option
(i.e., the ability to sell stock). Hence, the repurchase announcement can be viewed
as simply preserving the bull side of a straddle. Under the straddle hypothesis,
the repurchase announcement is not an attempt to signal current mispricing.
Rather, the repurchase announcement simply preserves management’s ability to
exploit future information set deviations between insiders and outsiders.
The straddle hypothesis is consistent with evidence presented by Baker and
Wurgler (2002) in a study of ﬁnancial structure. Speciﬁcally, in the context of a
explaining capital structure variation, Baker and Wurgler show that managers
attempt to exploit informational asymmetries by repurchasing shares when equity
values are ‘‘low’’ and issuing shares when equity values are ‘‘high’’ (i.e., timing
the market). The question is whether a repurchase announcement is a signal of
the ﬁrm’s positive future prospects (i.e., the signaling hypothesis) or whether it is
a device to acquire options on the ﬁrm’s shares to be exercised in the event of
future mispricing (i.e., the exchange option hypothesis and the straddle
hypothesis). Consistent with Baker and Wurgler, the straddle hypothesis extends
the exchange option hypothesis by speciﬁcally allowing for inside information
(i.e., management’s information set) to be positive or negative. If the straddle
hypothesis is a valid view of repurchase announcement phenomena, management
should be observed exercising the long call (i.e., the repurchase) amid superior
and positive information about the ﬁrm’s future prospects and exercising the long
put (i.e., the ability to sell stock) amid superior and negative information about
the ﬁrm’s future prospects.
This paper advances the literature by examining long-run returns and completion
rates for REIT repurchase announcements and by differentiating the impact of the
signaling hypothesis, the exchange hypothesis, and the straddle hypothesis. As
with Brau and Holmes (2006), contamination from other traditional hypotheses
such as the agency cost hypothesis or the tax-impact hypothesis is avoided by
using a REIT sample. Of the three hypotheses considered, the ﬁndings support
only the validity of the straddle hypothesis as an explanation for 1) the abnormal
returns observed around REIT share repurchase announcements and 2) the
subsequent implementation of the repurchase program.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First there is a succinct
literature review followed by the testable implications of the three hypotheses.
Next there is a discussion of the data and results. The paper closes with concluding
remarks.118  Adams, Brau, and Holmes
 Testable Implications: Signaling, Exchange Option, and
Straddle Hypotheses
The managerial signaling hypothesis is based on current asymmetry in the
information sets between managers and shareholders. Under the signaling
hypothesis, if management views the ﬁrm’s shares as undervalued, the
announcement of a repurchase may serve to homogenize the information sets
between the two groups (Aharony and Swary, 1980; Vermaelen, 1984; Ofer and
Thakor, 1987; Healy and Palepu, 1988; and Constantinides and Grundy, 1989).
The most frequent prediction of the signaling hypothesis is that a repurchase
program announcement will precipitate a positive stock price reaction. Many
authors, including Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981), Asquith and Mullins (1986),
Comment and Jarrell (1991), and Stephens and Weisbach (1998), empirically
document positive stock price reactions following repurchase announcements and
offer interpretations consistent with the managerial signaling hypothesis. More
recently, Giambona, Giaccotto, and Sirmans (2005) document positive abnormal
returns in a REIT sample following a repurchase announcement. Under the
signaling hypothesis, positive stock price reaction should accompany repurchase
announcements due to the undervaluation conveyed in the signal. This positive
reaction will be related to the current degree of mispricing; given that the signal
homogenizes the information sets, there is no reason to expect option valuation
parameters such as stock volatility to impact the magnitude of the reaction. That
is, unlike the other hypotheses, the signaling hypothesis makes no indications that
the magnitude of the repurchase announcement reaction is option based.
Previous literature (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; and
Giambona, Giaccotto, and Sirmans, 2005) documents that outside investors
typically under-react to share repurchases. That is, outside investors do not
immediately fully impound management’s signal into the stock price. However,
over time, as outsiders observe evidence to collaborate the signal, they drive up
the stock price. Based on this literature, the signaling hypothesis predicts
announcing ﬁrms will have superior post-announcement stock price performance.
Finally, if the ﬁrm is undervalued at the time of the announcement, one would
expect to observe signiﬁcant buy-back activity after the announcement and little
or no stock issuance in the period following the announcement. Hence, if the
signaling hypothesis is a robust explanation for repurchase announcement
motivation, one would hypothesize the following empirical implications:
 H1signaling: A positive reaction to the repurchase announcement;
 H2signaling: The magnitude of the announcement reaction will not be
dependent on option valuation determinants;
 H3signaling: Superior stock price performance in the post-announcement
period;
 H4signaling: High completion rates for the announced repurchase programs;
andREIT Stock Repurchases  119
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 H5signaling: Very few ﬁrms issue new shares in the period following the
announcement.
The exchange option hypothesis does not assume current share mispricing. Rather,
the exchange option hypothesis asserts that the repurchase announcement simply
creates an option to buy the ﬁrm’s shares if management has superior and positive
information relative to outside investors. The option’s value will result in a positive
share price reaction to the announcement. Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) show
that the magnitude of the stock price reaction to the repurchase announcement
varies with standard option valuation parameters.6 For instance, high volatility
stocks (where there is a presumably greater possibility of divergence in the
information set of insiders and outsiders) experience a signiﬁcantly greater
announcement period reaction than less volatile stocks. Hence, as with the
signaling hypothesis, the exchange option hypothesis predicts a positive reaction
to the announcement. Unlike the signaling hypothesis, however, there is no
expectation of systematic superior performance in the post-announcement period
since there is no assumed asymmetry in the relevant information sets at the time
of the announcement.
If the relevant information sets witness no divergence, the exchange option will
go unexercised. Given that the completion of the repurchase program depends on
the future divergence of information sets, the exchange option hypothesis offers
a potential explanation for the low completion rates of repurchase programs (e.g.,
Wiggins, 1994; Usem, Shulman, and Brown, 1995; and Stephens and Weisbach,
1998). Additionally, a strict interpretation of the exchange option hypothesis
would indicate that announcing ﬁrms would be unlikely to issue shares in the
post-announcement period given the focus on the call option created. Hence, if
the exchange option hypothesis is a robust explanation of the motivation for stock
repurchase announcements, one would hypothesize the following empirical
implications:
 H1exchange: A positive reaction to the repurchase announcement;
 H2exchange: The magnitude of the announcement reaction will be
dependent on option valuation determinants;
 H3exchange: Unbiased stock price performance in the post-announcement
period;
 H4exchange: Low completion rates for announced programs; and
 H5exchange: Very few ﬁrms issue new shares in the period following the
announcement.
Like the exchange option hypothesis, the straddle hypothesis does not assume
current mispricing. However, the straddle hypothesis extends the exchange option
hypothesis to allow for both positive and negative divergence in the information
sets possessed by managers and shareholders. Speciﬁcally, the straddle hypothesis
explicitly allows for post-announcement insider information to be positive or
negative.120  Adams, Brau, and Holmes
Under the exchange option hypothesis, the repurchase announcement creates a
call option on the ﬁrm’s shares which management will exercise to the long-term
shareholders’ beneﬁt if management comes to possess superior and positive
information. Under the straddle hypothesis, the call option created by the
repurchase option is simply the companion leg to the existing put option that
management already possesses with the ability to issue additional shares. That is,
since all ﬁrms possess the option to sell stock (subject to legal requirements and
corporate governance considerations), the repurchase announcement simply
completes the straddle by adding a call option.
The straddle hypothesis is best envisioned as an extension of the exchange option
hypothesis. However, the straddle hypothesis may offer a more complete
explanation for the stock price reaction to the announcement and, in particular,
the post-announcement behavior of the announcing ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, under the
straddle hypothesis one would expect to see a positive stock price reaction to
the repurchase announcement, unbiased performance in the post-announcement
period, and low completion rates among repurchase programs. However, if the
straddle is a more robust explanation of the repurchase behavior of announcing
ﬁrms, one would also expect to see the put option exercised with some regularity.
If the signaling hypothesis is correct or if the exchange option hypothesis is
complete, it would be difﬁcult to explain situations where a ﬁrm announced a
repurchase program only to issue shares in the post-announcement period. In fact,
the existing empirical literature does not consider the option to issue shares in
the post-announcement period. Hence, if the straddle hypothesis is a robust
explanation of the motivation for stock repurchase announcements, one would
hypothesize the following empirical implications:
 H1straddle: A positive reaction to the repurchase announcement;
 H2straddle: The magnitude of the announcement reaction will be dependent
on option valuation determinants;
 H3straddle: Unbiased stock price performance in the post-announcement
period;
 H4straddle: Low completion rates for announced programs; and
 H5straddle: Signiﬁcant numbers of ﬁrms issue new shares following the
announcement.
Exhibit 1 summarizes the empirical implications of all three hypotheses.
 Data Description
Sample Selection
The sample of 149 REIT open market repurchase announcements is taken from
Security Data Company’s (SDC) Merger and Acquisition database for the yearsREIT Stock Repurchases  121
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1989 through 2001.7 The criteria for inclusion are: (1) that the transaction is
classiﬁed as an open market share repurchase by the SDC; (2) that the ﬁrm is a
REIT (SIC Code 6798); (3) that the announcing REIT had the required data from
Standard and Poor’s Compustat database and the University of Chicago’s Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Exhibit 2 reports the frequency
of announcements by year and shows that the bulk (44%) of the announcements
occur in 1998 and 1999.8 To ensure that the observation cluster in 1998 and 1999
does not induce bias, the subsequent OLS models employ dummy variables for
announcements in 1998 and in 1999. The results are robust to this perturbation.
 Empirical Methods
Abnormal returns surrounding the repurchase announcements are estimated using
a market-adjustment approach employing a REIT index as the market. If a ﬁrm
has announced a repurchase within a year surrounding the date of the REIT
announcement in question, it is not included in the index. A 21-day event window
surrounding the announcement is used (Exhibit 3). In the subsequent regression
models, the dependent variable is the ﬁve-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
calculated using the two days before the announcement, the announcement date,
and the two days following the announcement (Exhibit 4). A ﬁve-day window
was selected to allow for any leakage preceding the announcement and for those
announcements that take place after the market closes and to be consistent with
the existing literature (e.g., Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996).9
In the subsequent long-run return tests, abnormal long-run returns are computed
using CARs, with a non-announcing REIT index as the benchmark (Exhibit 5).
CARs were selected for three primary reasons. First, the long-run analysis uses
CARs for comparability with the existing literature (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok,
and Vermaelen, 2000). Second, Fama (1998) argues for the use of CARs as
opposed to buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Fama argues that ‘‘. . .theoretical and122  Adams, Brau, and Holmes










1989 5 3.36 5 3.36
1990 10 6.71 15 10.07
1991 5 3.36 20 13.42
1992 10 6.71 30 20.13
1993 7 4.70 37 24.83
1994 7 4.70 44 29.53
1995 9 6.04 53 35.57
1996 13 8.72 66 44.30
1997 9 6.04 75 50.34
1998 36 24.16 111 74.50
1999 29 19.46 140 93.96
2000 8 5.37 148 99.33
2001 1 0.67 149 100
Notes: The sample is drawn from the Security Data Company’s Merger and Acquisition database
(SDC) and includes all REIT open market share repurchase announcements with available
Compustat and CRSP data.
statistical considerations alike suggest that formal inferences about long-term
returns should be based on averages or sums of short-term abnormal returns
(AARs or CARs) rather than the currently popular buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHARs).’’ Third, CARs are used instead of the Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999)
characteristic matching method because characteristic matching is not well-
speciﬁed when the benchmark sample is from one four-digit SIC code (such as
REITs).10 A period of two years was chosen after the announcement based on the
theoretical work of Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996, Table 1).
 Results
Direction and Magnitude of the Announcement Reaction
Exhibit 3 shows the aggregate announcement period reaction to the sample
repurchase announcements. Consistent with all three hypotheses, the data show a
positive announcement stock effect. Panel A reports the abnormal returns for a
21-day window around the announcement date. The positive share price reactionsREIT Stock Repurchases  123
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Exhibit 3  Event Study Abnormal Returns where Day 0 is the Announcement of an Open Market Share
Repurchase by a Real Estate Investment Trust: 1989–2001
Panel A: Abnormal returns






















Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns






Notes: The sample is drawn from the Security Data Company’s Merger and Acquisition database
(SDC) and includes all REIT open market share repurchase announcements with available CRSP
and Compustat data from 1989 to 2001. Abnormal returns are calculated using market-adjusted
event-study methodology with a REIT index of non-announcing REITs as the market proxy. A
21-day event window surrounding the announcement is used. In Panel B, CARs are cumulative
abnormal returns over the speciﬁed period. The t-Statistic is for the null hypothesis that the
abnormal return or CAR for the respective day(s) equals zero. 0 is the announcement day.124  Adams, Brau, and Holmes




































Notes: The sample is drawn from the Security Data Company’s Merger and Acquisition database
(SDC) and includes all REIT open market share repurchase announcements with available CRSP
and Compustat data from 1989 to 2001. The dependent variable is the ﬁve-day cumulative
abnormal return.
on days 0 and 1 are statistically signiﬁcant (20 and 33 basis points respectively).
Panel B shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Over days 2t o2
(i.e., a 5-day CAR), there is an abnormal return of 67 basis points. This CAR,
which is highly signiﬁcance (t  5.06), is similar to results in other studies (e.g.,
see Dann, 1981; and Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996).11
The data in Exhibit 3 show that the announcement period response is positive.
However, all three theories predict the positive announcement period return.
Hence, the positive reaction provides evidence that REIT and non-REIT samples
respond similarly to the announcement, but does not validate one hypothesis over
another.
The Announcement Reaction and Option Valuation
Determinants
Under the signaling hypothesis, the magnitude of the announcement period
reaction is invariant to option pricing parameters. Conversely, both the exchange
option hypothesis and the straddle hypothesis predict that the magnitude of the
announcement reaction varies with standard option valuation determinants.
Margrabe (1978) derives a closed form solution for exchange option valuation.
While best viewed as a ﬁrst-order approximation of the option to repurchaseREIT Stock Repurchases  125
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Exhibit 5  Long-Run Abnormal Returns for REITs Announcing an Open Market Share Repurchase
Month AR t-Stat CAR t-Stat
1 0.17% 0.167 0.17% 0.167
2 0.35% 0.865 0.54% 0.490
3 1.09% 1.601 1.50% 1.529
4 0.96% 0.938 0.76% 0.458
5 0.10% 0.182 0.47% 0.321
6 1.18% 0.932 1.41% 1.102
7 0.42% 0.758 0.87% 0.531
8 1.70% 2.710 0.70% 0.437
9 1.35% 1.610 1.93% 0.950
10 1.11% 2.009 3.39% 1.805
11 0.84% 1.493 3.98% 1.995
12 0.94% 1.004 1.86% 0.552
13 1.08% 2.254 3.04% 1.009
14 0.13% 0.289 3.12% 1.155
15 0.35% 0.917 2.67% 0.927
16 0.99% 2.137 4.20% 1.516
17 0.08% 0.124 4.62% 1.481
18 1.84% 2.082 6.75% 2.676
19 0.12% 0.182 7.22% 2.935
20 0.31% 0.666 7.78% 2.911
21 1.12% 1.213 9.29% 2.596
22 0.55% 1.136 9.82% 3.579
23 0.45% 0.396 10.18% 2.960
24 1.16% 2.086 11.25% 3.312
Notes: The sample is drawn from the Security Data Company’s Merger and Acquisition database
(SDC) and includes all REIT open market share repurchase announcements with available CRSP
and Compustat data from 1989 to 2001. AR is the abnormal return using a non-announcing REIT-
index as the benchmark. The CAR is the cumulative abnormal return. The ﬁrst t-Stat is for the AR
and the second t-Stat is for the CAR.
shares, Margrabe’s model indicates that the value of the option created by a
repurchase announcement should be positively related to three factors: (1) the
volatility of the underlying asset (i.e., the announcing REIT); (2) the size of the
repurchase program; and (3) the correlation between the observed returns on the
underlying asset and the true returns on the underlying asset. Accordingly,
announcing a REIT’s volatility, VOLATILITY, should positively impact the option126  Adams, Brau, and Holmes
value and, therefore, the magnitude of the announcement reaction. Following
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), VOLATILITY is deﬁned here as the standard
deviation of monthly returns estimated in the 36 months prior to the
announcement. Ikenberry and Vermaelen also estimate the relationship between
VOLATILITY and repurchase announcement size for their sample of operating
ﬁrms. Additionally, they include estimates of the relationship between
announcement size and a proxy for the correlation between observed returns and
true returns. For consistency with Margrabe and comparability with Ikenberry and
Vermaelen, the size of the announced repurchase program is tested to see whether
the correlations between observed and true returns on the stock are signiﬁcant
determinants of the announcement reaction. The size of the repurchase program,
SIZE, is measured in similar fashion to Ikenberry and Vermaelen as the percentage
of outstanding shares announced in the repurchase program. Obviously, the
correlation between observed and true returns on the announcing REIT is not
observable. Again following Ikenberry and Vermaelen, this unobservable variable
is proxied as the R2 from a regression of the returns of the announcing REIT on
the returns on the REIT market (RSQR). Under the conditions speciﬁed in
Ikenberry and Vermaelen, this proxy represents a ﬂoor of sorts on the unobservable
correlation between observed returns and true returns. The higher the correlation,
the lower the potential beneﬁt of the exchange option, and therefore, the lower
the magnitude of the share price reaction to the announcement.
Exhibit 4 shows the results of various models estimated to examine the impact of
option pricing determinants on the magnitude of the repurchase announcement.
Following Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), the 5-day CAR is used as the
dependent variable in all models. The ﬁrst three models consider the three option
pricing determinants (i.e., VOLATILITY, SIZE, and RSQR) as univariate factors.
While SIZE and RSQR are not statistically signiﬁcant, VOLATILITY is signiﬁcant
with the expected positive coefﬁcient, which indicates that the magnitude of the
announcement reaction increases as the volatility of the underlying asset increases.
Unlike Ikenberry and Vermaelen, SIZE and RSQR are not signiﬁcant. The size
proxy may be difﬁcult for market participants to assess given that the size of the
announced program and the actual implementation of the program are frequently
very different. For RSQR, the results from the current study’s sample and the
results provided by Ikenberry and Vermaelen may differ for econometric reasons.
Ikenberry and Vermaelen examine a sample of operating ﬁrms from many different
industries. It is conceivable that the correlation of observed and true returns differ
across industries giving their analysis of signiﬁcant sample variation for the RSQR
variable. The sample in the current study includes only REITs. Given that all ﬁrms
in the sample operate in a common industry, the proxy for the correlation between
observed and true returns may exhibit comparatively little variation. Since
variation is necessary for statistical power, the difference in signiﬁcance between
the ﬁndings and the existing literature may simply be an artifact of the industry
concentration inherent in the sample. Similar logic might also be extended to the
SIZE variable. Given that VOLATILITY is the most purely measured of the three
determinants, the results appear to indicate that the magnitude of the
announcement reaction is inﬂuenced by option valuation determinants.REIT Stock Repurchases  127
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Model 4 uses the three option valuation determinants in a multivariate framework
and shows that the VOLATILITY variable is still signiﬁcant and positive (p-value
 .0530). To further assess the robustness of VOLATILITY on the magnitude of
the reaction, the multivariate relationship was also modeled with control variables
for market volatility. Speciﬁcally, a proxy for market volatility was added to the
regression equation in Model 5. In Model 6, a proxy for REIT market volatility
was added to the regression equation. The intuition behind the addition of the
control variables is to ensure that the volatility of the announcing REIT is not
merely proxying for market volatility. Models 1 and 4 show that the magnitude
of the announcement reaction is sensitive to the volatility of the announcing REIT.
If the announcing REIT’s volatility is merely acting as a proxy for market
volatility, one would expect the market volatility proxies to be signiﬁcant and to
subsume the impact of the individual REIT’s volatility. As Models 5 and 6 show
(Exhibit 4), this is not the case—VOLATILITY maintains its statistical signiﬁcance.
The regression results indicate that the magnitude of the announcement reaction
is sensitive to the option valuation determinant that can be closely measured.
While this evidence is consistent with both the exchange option hypothesis and
the straddle hypothesis, the evidence does not support the validity of the signaling
hypothesis.
Post-Announcement Stock Price Performance
When considering the signaling hypothesis, the assumed current underpricing of
the announcing REIT may manifest itself as superior performance in the post-
announcement period. That is, if the ﬁrm is currently undervalued, the signal
proffered by the repurchase announcement should serve to align the relevant
information sets resulting in a positive announcement period reaction in perfectly
efﬁcient markets. However, to the extent that the positive news held by
management is not fully conveyed to the market by the repurchase announcement
(i.e., incomplete information transfer; see Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen,
1995), the ﬁrm may realize superior returns in the post-announcement period as
the untransferred positive news impacts observed stock performance. Conversely,
the exchange option hypothesis and the straddle hypothesis give no indication that
performance in the post-announcement period should be abnormally positive or
negative.
When working with a sample (with some time clustering), the post-announcement
performance will track the evolution of information asymmetries. That is, if the
holders of the option (either the exchange option or the straddle) generally come
to possess positive private information, the post-announcement performance in any
period will be positive. If the holders of the option generally come to possess
negative private information, the post-announcement performance will be
abnormally negative. Hence, unlike the signaling hypothesis that inimitably
predicts positive post-announcement (i.e., long-run) performance, the option
hypotheses would be consistent with any post-announcement outcome. Thus,128  Adams, Brau, and Holmes
if post-announcement performance is unbiased (allowing for the case of
informationally efﬁcient markets) or abnormally positive (allowing for incomplete
information transfers), the conclusion is that the data do not allow differentiation
among the three hypotheses on this dimension. However, if the post-announcement
performance is abnormally negative, the conclusion is that this evidence supports
the efﬁcacy of the option hypotheses.
The stock price performance of announcing REITs was examined for 24 months
following the announcement to assess post-announcement performance. The
framework set forth in Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000) was
employed to examine long-run return and post-repurchase excess returns. The
results, reported in Exhibit 5, show the abnormal monthly returns (based on the
REIT index of non-announcing REITS) and the cumulative abnormal returns for
announcing REITs. The monthly and cumulative returns are normal for the ﬁrst
seven months after the announcement. However, beginning in the eighth month,
both the monthly abnormal return and the CAR become negative. After 24 months,
the CAR for announcing REITs is 11.25% and is signiﬁcant beyond the 0.01
level. As described above, this negative and signiﬁcant post-announcement
performance is inconsistent with the signaling hypothesis.12
Repurchase Program Completion Rates
If the signaling hypothesis is valid, the ﬁrm’s current underpricing would likely
lead to high completion rates for announced repurchase programs. This is
especially true in an Ikenberry-Lakonishok-Vermaelen (1995) world that assumes
underreaction to the announcement. That is, if the underreaction hypothesis is
accurate, the observed post-announcement behavior would be biased towards the
repurchase option being exercised. Additionally, the establishment of a valid
signaling equilibrium is based on actual implementation of the announced
program, thus pointing to a high completion rate.
Conversely, the option hypotheses do not assume that the announcer’s shares are
currently mispriced. With the option hypotheses, the option to repurchase stock
will only be exercised when the information sets available to managers and market
participants diverge in such a way that ﬁrm insiders come to possess superior and
positive information. If the information asymmetry evolves in any other manner,
the option to repurchase will not be exercised. Hence, high completion rates are
posited to be consistent with the validity of the signaling hypothesis and that low
completion rates are consistent with the option hypotheses. The problem, of
course, with this conjecture is the quantiﬁcation of what is ‘‘high’’ and what is
‘‘low.’’ While completion rates of less than 50% are interpreted here as low, the
ﬁnal judgment is left to the reader.
Four completion-rate metrics developed by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) were
used to assess completion rates: (1) CRSP decrease in shares outstanding; (2)
Compustat decrease in shares outstanding; (3) net dollars spent on repurchasesREIT Stock Repurchases  129
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divided by the low price; and (4) the net dollars spent on repurchases divided by
the average price.13 As with Stephens and Weisbach (1998), each completion-rate
metric is examined on a truncated basis (truncation at 0% and 100% of announced
repurchase) and on a non-truncated basis. Panel A of Exhibit 6 reports the
truncated completion rates for announced repurchase programs over a two-year
period. The completion rate for announced programs (using truncated data) is 50%
or less. This means that, on average, less than 50% of the shares optioned with
the repurchase announcement are actually repurchased. Completion rates in the
50% and below range are consistent with estimates reported elsewhere in the
literature (see Endnote 2). This ﬁnding is inconsistent with the signaling
hypothesis and consistent with both option hypotheses.
Share Issuance in the Post-Announcement Period
The signaling hypothesis leads to no indication that ﬁrms would issue shares in
the post-announcement period. However, unlike the other four empirical outcomes,
the issuance of shares in the post-announcement period is the one empirical
implication where the exchange option hypothesis and the straddle hypothesis
diverge. Speciﬁcally, the exchange option hypothesis focuses on the creation of
the call option created by the repurchase announcement. A strict interpretation of
this hypothesis offers no rationale for the ﬁrm creating a call option only to issue
shares. Conversely, the straddle hypothesis explicitly considers both the created
call option (i.e., the right to repurchase shares) and the permanent put option (i.e.,
the right to sell shares) that is available to all ﬁrms. Hence, if signiﬁcant share
issuance activity is observed in the post-announcement period, this is interpreted
as evidence that the straddle hypothesis is a more robust paradigm in which to
view the decision to announce a stock repurchase program and the post-
announcement behavior of ﬁrm managers.
Again consistent with Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Panel B of Exhibit 6 reports
untruncated data on the actual change in shares outstanding for eight quarters after
the repurchase announcement.14 The results are dramatic. Over two-years,
announcing ﬁrms on average issue approximately twice as many shares as they
indicated they would repurchase in the original repurchase announcement. That
is, for the average announcing ﬁrm, management actually increases shares
outstanding in the post-announcement period by roughly twice as many shares as
the announcement indicated would be repurchased.
Panel C of Exhibit 6 extends this analysis by reporting the percentage of
announcing ﬁrms that fall into various completion ranges. The data show that less
than a third (32%) of announcing ﬁrms repurchase 100% or more of the shares
indicated in the original announcement. More than a third (34%) of ﬁrms
announcing repurchase programs are actually net issuers of shares in the post-
announcement period. The existence of a signiﬁcant percentage of ﬁrms that are
net issuers in the post-announcement period is inconsistent with both the signaling
hypothesis and the exchange option hypothesis. The issuance of additional shares
























Exhibit 6  Estimated Completion Rates for REITs Announcing an Open Market Share Repurchase
Quarter 0 Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Quarter 5 Quarter 6 Quarter 7
Panel A: Truncated at 0 and 100
CRSP decreases in shares outstanding 0.03 0.23 0.33 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.47
Compustat decreases in shares
outstanding
0.25 0.33 0.39 0.45 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.46
Net dollars spent on repurchases/
low price
0.22 0.38 0.47 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.50
Net dollars spent on repurchases/
average price
0.22 0.37 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.49
Panel B: Not truncated
CRSP decreases in shares outstanding 0.07 0.14 0.02 0.38 0.87 1.29 1.54 2.01
Compustat decreases in shares
outstanding
0.19 0.14 0.27 0.67 0.96 1.29 1.54 2.31
Net dollars spent on repurchases/
low price
0.89 1.58 1.71 1.81 2.00 2.57 2.88 3.96
Net dollars spent on repurchases/
average price













































Exhibit 6  (continued)
Estimated Completion Rates for REITs Announcing an Open Market Share Repurchase
Quarter 0 Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Quarter 5 Quarter 6 Quarter 7
Panel C: Percentage of ﬁrms buying back the respective amount
200% 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13
100% 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.31 0.32
50% 0.03 0.21 0.30 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.46
20% 0.95 0.69 0.52 0.44 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.44
5% 0.93 0.62 0.44 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.36
1% 0.93 0.56 0.38 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.36
0% 0.14 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.34
Notes: The sample is drawn from the Security Data Company’s Merger and Acquisition database (SDC) and includes all REIT open market share repurchase
announcements with available CRSP and Compustat data from 1989 to 2001.132  Adams, Brau, and Holmes
As a ﬁnal check, correlation between the change in shares outstanding and lagged
quarterly stock returns is estimated. The correlation is signiﬁcant and negative
(correlation  0.10, p-value  .0031), which indicates that announcing ﬁrms
issue shares in the quarter before abnormally negative performance and repurchase
shares in the quarter before abnormally positive performance. The negative
correlation between share changes and lagged returns again supports the straddle
hypothesis and not the two competing hypotheses.
 Conclusion
This paper empirically documents the impact of REIT repurchase announcements
and evaluates three hypotheses concerning the decision of ﬁrms to repurchase
shares. The three hypotheses include: (1) the signaling hypothesis; (2) the
exchange option hypothesis; and (3) the straddle hypothesis. Each hypothesis has
testable implications in ﬁve areas, including:
1. The direction of the announcement period stock price reaction;
2. The determinants of the magnitude of the announcement period stock
price reaction;
3. The post-announcement (i.e., long-run) stock price performance;
4. The completion rates of the announced repurchase program; and
5. The post-announcement issuance of shares.
With the exception of the ﬁrst of these implications (direction of announcement
period reaction), there are differences in the implications engendered by the
hypotheses. The last four implications permit examination of the robustness of
the three hypotheses. No support is found in any of the four differentiating
implications for the signaling hypothesis. For three of the four testable
implications (numbers 2–4 above), the exchange option hypothesis and the
straddle hypothesis lead to the same predicted outcome. For each of these three
implications, the data support the validity of both option hypotheses.
The exchange option hypothesis and the straddle hypothesis lead to different
predicted outcomes only in the post-announcement issuance of shares (testable
implication #5). When this implication is evaluated, strong evidence is found in
support of the straddle hypothesis. Exhibit 7 summarizes the ﬁndings with respect
to the four differentiating implications.
The straddle hypothesis is best viewed as an extension of the exchange option
hypothesis. However, the explicit recognition of the short leg of the straddle (i.e.,
the option to issue shares) does provide a more robust understanding of the
motivation to announce repurchase programs and the behavior of ﬁrm management
in the post-announcement period.REIT Stock Repurchases  133
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Inconsistent Inconsistent Inconsistent Inconsistent
Exchange Option
Hypothesis
Consistent Consistent Consistent Inconsistent
Straddle Hypothesis Consistent Consistent Consistent Consistent
 Endnotes
1 SEC Rule 10b-18 expressly allows ﬁrms to trade their own stock.
2 For example, Usem, Shulman, and Brown (1995) report that in their sample announcing
ﬁrms bought back only 18% of the shares included in the announcement. Additionally,
Wiggins (1994) shows that fewer than 50% of announcing ﬁrms reported a decrease in
shares outstanding of more than 0.5% in the period following the announcement.
3 For a discussion of the uniqueness of REIT capital structures, see Riddiough (2004) and
Ott, Riddiough, and Yi (2005).
4 Lie (2000) shows that excess cash is a motivating factor in disbursement decisions for
operating ﬁrms. Brau and Holmes (2006) show that this is not a factor for REITs given
the diminished ability of REIT managers to accumulate and misuse cash.
5 Brau and Holmes (2006) present empirical analysis that allows for the possibility that
the traditional hypotheses other than signaling (i.e., agency costs and tax) exist. The
reported analysis shows no support for these alternative hypotheses. Since the data sets
are the same, their conclusions have direct applicability to the current article.
6 See Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), section I.C. for the formalization of repurchase
announcements without signaling and the modeling of the exchange option.
7 The sample period ends in 2001 to allow for a long enough time span after the
announcement to compute long-run returns and repurchase completion rates.
8 The distribution of announcements across days of the week was also examined to insure
that the analysis is not contaminated by the day-of-the-week effect. The intra-week
distribution of announcements is fairly constant, with no over-weighting of a particular
day.
9 In unreported tests, the results are robust to alternate CAR measures (2-day CARs using
day 1 and day 0 as well as day 0 and day 1, the 1-day AR for day 0, and the 2-day
CAR for day 0, day 1, and day 2).
10 When REIT ﬁrms are matched without replacement, benchmark ﬁrm matching
systematically degrades and paired matches quickly become dissimilar. If matches are
made with replacement, then a few non-announcing REITs appear many times in the134  Adams, Brau, and Holmes
benchmark sample. In this case, the results would become a test of a few benchmark
ﬁrms rather than a test of the announcing sample ﬁrms.
11 See Brau and Holmes (2006, Table 8) for a cross-section analysis of the REIT
announcement returns that includes the Wilshire REIT index returns, and one and two
month lagged Wilshire REIT index returns to control for possible industry-wide effects.
12 Having stated the limitations of the Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) method for REITs,
the analysis was performed for robustness purposes anyway. The long-run returns via
the Lyon, Barber, and Tsai matching method resulted in insigniﬁcant (negative) long-
run performance. Although deﬁnitive conclusions are not made based on the
characteristic benchmarking methods, for it is not well-speciﬁed for REITs, the
insigniﬁcant long-run returns do not support the signaling hypothesis, which predicts
positive abnormal long-run returns.
13 Dividing by the low price effective assumes that the repurchase was optimally timed.
Hence, this metric likely overstates the extent of completion rates.
14 Stock splits and stock dividends were controlled for when measuring decreases in shares
outstanding.
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